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Consent to psychiatric treatment: From insight (into illness) to incite (a riot) 
Sheila Wildeman* 
[pre-publication version of chapter included in Colleen Flood & Jennifer Chandler, eds, 




Debates concerning treatment decision-making in the embattled domain of mental health 
law tend to centre upon the right to refuse treatment.1 In these debates, refusal is 
positioned as the last card to be played in a contest between the individual identified as in 
need of treatment (for whom the prospect of treatment constitutes a threat of profound, 
identity-annihilating violence) and the health provider charged with advancing the 
individual’s and/or the public’s welfare.2  Focusing on the right to refuse -- while 
scrutinizing the limits on that right – has the merit of drawing attention to the dynamics 
of power and resistance inherent in the diagnosis and treatment of mental health 
disability.  Moreover, the right to refuse gives concrete expression to an essential 
dimension of the value of liberty – i.e., liberty as “negative freedom.”3 The importance of 
freedom from state-backed coercion – or, more precisely, the importance of the guarantee 
that such freedom will not be limited except in accordance with the procedural and 
substantive protections integral to public justification – cannot be overstated.  Where the 
freedom in question engages the preservation of one’s bodily integrity as well as one’s 
mental states, then its importance must be recognized as of the highest order.   
 
And yet negative freedom is but one expression of the normative construct of autonomy 
that gives shape to the law on treatment decision-making in and beyond mental health 
settings.  That is, as this chapter explores, the law on consent to psychiatric treatment is 
concerned not only with voluntariness but also with what it means for treatment choice to 
be adequately informed – an element of consent placing positive legal duties on health 
providers.  Moreover, debates on the law structuring psychiatric treatment choice have in 
recent years been increasingly oriented to the prospect of duties placed on both health 
professionals and more broadly on the state to provide supports and resources (beyond 
information) to assist individuals in exercising legal capacity and so in actualizing the 
right to medical self-determination.  
 
	
* Thanks to Jennifer Chandler and Colleen Flood for bringing together this project and for their patient 
editorial assistance.  Thanks also to Ilana Luther and Brad Abernethy, and the anonymous reviewers.  
1 A few diverse examples from the Canadian literature on the right to refuse psychiatric interventions 
(reaching back to the 1980s and 90s) include C.H. Cahn, “The ethics of involuntary treatment: the position 
of the Canadian Psychiatric Association” (1982) 27 Can J Psychiatry 67; Bonnie Burstow & Don Weitz, 
Shrink Resistant: The Struggle Against Psychiatry in Canada (Vancouver: New Star, 1988); Isabel Grant, 
“Mental Health Law and the Courts” (1991) 29:4 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 747; Thomas G. Gratzer and 
Manuel Matas, “The Right to Refuse Treatment: Recent Canadian Developments” (1994) 22:2 Bulletin of 
the Am Academy of Psychiatry and Law 249; Sarah MacKenzie, “Informed Consent: The Right of 
Psychiatric Patients to Refuse Treatment” (1993) DJLS 59.  
2 See Sophie Nunnelly’s argument in Chapter xx that strategies of public justification for forced treatment 
tend to shuttle unstably between conceptions of public safety and individual welfare. 
3 Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty” in Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1969) 118.	
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The aim of this chapter is to go back to the basics on consent to treatment, starting with 
the right to refuse and building from there.  Part II addresses the leading judicial 
statements on the value of medical self-determination, and in light of these statements, 
considers what is at stake in psychiatric treatment choice.  Part III explores the three core 
elements of valid consent to treatment -- namely that consent be voluntary, informed and 
capable -- with attention to variation in the law amongst provinces and territories, and 
some lines of analysis and critique specifically applicable to mental health care contexts. 
Part IV considers new directions in law and policy clustering around the concept of 
supported decision-making – a concept forged through domestic and international 
disability rights advocacy, which urges fundamental re-examination of the 





The Supreme Court of Canada has placed a high priority on the right to “decide one’s 
own fate”5 in respect to medical decisions.  The leading statements on point were recently 
consolidated in the unanimous judgment in Carter v. Canada: 
The law has long protected patient autonomy in medical decision-
making…competent individuals are — and should be — free to make decisions 
about their bodily integrity” [. . .].  This right to “decide one’s own fate” [. . .] 
underlies the concept of “informed consent” and is protected by s. 7’s guarantee 
of liberty and security of the person [. . .].  [T]he right of medical self-
determination is not vitiated by the fact that serious risks or consequences, 
including death, may flow from the patient’s decision.6 
The value of medical self-determination applies with comparable intensity in disputes 
about psychiatric treatment.  In Starson v Swayze,7 a judgment addressing a disputed 
assessment of decision-making capacity under Ontario law (discussed later in this 
chapter), the majority observed:  
	
4 For a critique of the failure to shift from a paternalistic and coercive model of mental health law and 
policy in Canada to a model oriented instead to addressing the social determinants of mental health, see H. 
A. Kaiser, “Canadian Mental Health Law: The Slow Process of Redirecting the Ship of State” (2009) 17 
Health Law Journal 139. 
5 Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5, [2015] 1 SCR 331 at para 67, citing A.C. v. Manitoba 
(Director of Child and Family Services), 2009 SCC 30, [2009] 2 SCR 181 at para 39. See also the valuable 
analysis of the background case law in Simon N Verdun-Jones & Michelle S Lawrence, “The Charter Right 
to Refuse Treatment: A Comparative Analysis of the Laws of Ontario and British Columbia Concerning the 
Right of Mental-Health Patients to Refuse Psychiatric Treatment” 46:2 UBC Law Review 489 at 490-498.  
6 Carter v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5, [2015] 1 SCR 331 at para 67 [citations omitted].   
7 2003 SCC 32, [2003] 1 SCR 722. 
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The right to refuse unwanted medical treatment is fundamental to a person’s 
dignity and autonomy.  This right is equally important in the context of treatment 
for mental illness.8	
In Starson, the Court further observed (now citing the Ontario Court of Appeal in 
Fleming v. Reid9): 
Few medical procedures can be more intrusive than the forcible injection of 
powerful mind-altering drugs which are often accompanied by severe and 
sometimes irreversible adverse side effects.10 
This statement has been criticized on the argument that it overplays the dangers of 
psychiatric medications and minimizes their positive effects.11  In this vein, the human 
needs orientation to the law on consent to psychiatric treatment argues for attention to the 
ways that psychiatric medications may not only restore health but also liberty (i.e., 
freedom from involuntary confinement), and autonomy (i.e., the rationality that informs 
self-direction).12  The critics argue more specifically that the courts failed to appreciate 
what was at stake in both Fleming v. Reid and in Starson – both cases involving 
psychiatric treatment refusal in the context of involuntary psychiatric hospitalization. In 
such cases, the critics argue, the putative interest in treatment refusal should be more 
explicitly or carefully weighed against the possibility of indefinite detention and its 
effects not only on the individual him or herself, but also other patients and staff.13  
One response to the critics is simply to return to the overwhelming priority placed on 
medical self-determination in the leading cases.  This suggests, if not a clear normative 
preferencing of the interest in bodily and psychological integrity over the interest in 
freedom from restricted mobility, then in any case a determination that individuals should 
	
8  Ibid at para 75.    
9 (1991), 4 OR (3d) 74 (CA). 
10 Ibid at p 88, cited in Starson v. Swayze, supra note x at para 75. 
Robins JA lists a range of side effects of antipsychotic drugs, including: 
 muscular side effects known as extra- pyramidal reactions: dystonia (muscle spasms, 
 particularly in the face and arms, irregular flexing, writhing or grimacing and protrusion of the 
 tongue); akathesia (internal restlessness or agitation, an inability to sit still); akinesia (physical 
 immobility and lack of spontaneity); and Parkinsonisms (mask- like facial expression, drooling, 
 muscle stiffness, tremors, shuffling gait). The drugs can also cause a number of non- muscular 
 side effects, such as blurred vision, dry mouth and throat, weight gain, dizziness, fainting, 
 depression, low blood pressure and, less frequently, cardiovascular changes and, on occasion, 
 sudden death. (ibid) 
11 See John E. Gray, Margaret A. Shone & Peter F. Liddle, Canadian Mental Health Law and Policy, 2nd ed 
(Markham: LexisNexis, 2008) at 11-14 (distinguishing a “human needs” perspective on mental health law 
and policy  -- based in a biological model of the roots of mental health disability, and more specifically, the 
thesis that “lack of insight” into illness or the need for treatment has a biological cause) from a “civil 
libertarian” perspective (one “that views mental health legislation as an often-unjustifiable intrusion by the 
state on the freedom of the individual”); and at 45 (objecting to the terms “mind controlling” and “mind 
altering” used by Robins JA in Fleming v Reid).   
12 Ibid at 235-242. 
13 Ibid at 242-247.  
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be given their “choice of hells,”14 i.e. the right to weigh on their own terms the relative 
awfulness of the prospects (as these are constructed in the dominant institutional 
framework) of indefinite detention without treatment or possible release conditional on 
treatment.  Another response turns upon the point that there continue to be serious 
controversies about the safety and efficacy of psychiatric medications.15  Related to this is 
the observation that it cannot be predicted with certainty what effect (within a broad 
range of possible effects) a given drug will have in the individual case – whether in terms 
of side effects or primary intended effect.16 In other words, one cannot simply assume 
that individuals such as Starson or Reid will or would ever respond to medications in a 
manner deemed medically optimal.   
Finally, discussion of what is at stake in psychiatric treatment choice must take account 
of the complexity of how treatment and non-treatment feel to the individual “from the 
inside.”  For instance, psychiatric medications and the conditions for which they are 
prescribed may interact with personal identity in complex ways, not easily translated to a 
typical risk-benefit profile.  Thus while some who are diagnosed with mental health 
conditions may have no difficulty distinguishing themselves from mental states they 
would readily characterize as expressive of a disease, others understand their experiences 
in ambivalent or even positive terms – as part (even if a troubled part) of one’s identity or 
of making meaning of one’s life.17 Added to this is the further complexity that treatment 
refusal may be one piece of a broader politically and personally coherent objective of 
expressing resistance to what for many are highly adversarial encounters with the mental 
health system (i.e. police apprehension, restraints, forced injection).  All this counsels an 




The common law, along with Quebec’s Civil Code,18 expresses the value of medical self-
determination by requiring that consent be voluntary, informed, and capable.  Several 
provinces have codified these three requirements.19  
	
14 Carla McKague in I. Shimrat, Call Me Crazy: Stories from the Mad Movement (Vancouver: Press Gang, 
1997) at 71. McKague was co-counsel for the applicants in Fleming v Reid. 
15 See, e.g., James Davies, Cracked: Why Psychiatry is Doing More Harm Than Good (London: Icon 
Books, 2003). 
16 See, e.g., J. A. Lieberman et al., “Time Course and Biologic Correlates of Treatment Response in First 
Episode Schizophrenia,” (1993) 50 Archives of General Psychiatry 369; J. A. Lieberman et al., 
“Effectiveness of Antipsychotic Drugs in Patients with Chronic Schizophrenia,” (2005) 353 New England 
Journal of Medicine 1209.  
17 See Peter Bartlett & Ralph Sandland, “Conceptualizing Mental Health Law” in Mental Health Law: 
Policy and Practice, 3rd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 1 at 2-10 (“Who are the insane?)  
18 Civil Code of Québec, CQLR c C-1991.  For elaboration of the distinct approach to liability for 
unconsented-to touching and lack of informed consent in Quebec’s civil law tradition, see Paul B. Miller, 
Sujit Choudry, and Angela Campbell,  “Legal Regulation of the Physician-Patient Relationship” 





As discussed in more detail by Sophie Nunnelley in chapter X, the approach to treatment 
decision-making for people admitted involuntarily to psychiatric hospital tends to depart 
from these background legal requirements, although the precise terms of departure vary 
across Canadian provinces and territories.  British Columbia effectively removes the 
requirement for an involuntary patient’s consent on the fiction of “deemed” consent.20 In 
contrast, in Ontario, the law on consent to treatment is the same in cases of involuntary 
psychiatric hospitalization as in all other civil contexts.21 Thus involuntary patients have 
the right to refuse treatment as well as to have their prior capable refusals respected.  In 
still other provinces and territories, capable as well as prior capable refusals of treatment 
may be overridden according to processes and standards specific to involuntary 
psychiatric patients.22  Finally, in a few provinces (Saskatchewan, Nova Scotia, and 
Newfoundland and Labrador), where involuntary psychiatric hospitalization is contingent 
upon incapacity to make decisions about treatment in or admission to psychiatric 
hospital, capable refusals are not contemplated among those with involuntary status.23  I 
set aside the question of the constitutionality of these different limits on the right to 
refuse treatment, to be explored in Sophie Nunnelly’s chapter.  In what follows, I deal 
with the law on consent to treatment beyond the special case of involuntary psychiatric 
hospitalization. However, it is important to note that even where statute law authorizes 
involuntary treatment or other physical force to be applied to persons who are 
involuntarily in psychiatric hospital, there are still necessarily legal limits on such 




Treatment or other bodily interference that is not consented to may give rise to liability in 
battery at common law, or charges under the Criminal Code (for instance, assault 
(s.265(1))).24 Alternatively, where the violation takes place in the exercise of a statutory 
	
19 Other provinces, as detailed below, have laws that speak to incapacity and substitute decision-making in 
health or mental health contexts, but just these four additionally set out the generally applicable 
prerequisites for valid consent to treatment.  See BC’s Health Care (Consent) and Care Facility 
(Admission) Act, RSBC 1996, c 181 [BC HCCFA]; Ontario’s Health Care Consent Act, 1996, SO 1996, c 
2, Sched A [Ontario HCCA], and Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, SO 1992, c 30; PEI’s Consent to 
Treatment and Health Care Directives Act, RSPEI 1988, c C-17.2; and the Yukon’s Decision-Making 
Support and Protection to Adults Act, SY 2003 c 21.  See also the Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, 
arts. 11 to 25. And see Patricia Peppin, "Informed Consent" in J. Downie, T. Caulfield & C. Flood, eds., 
Canadian Health Law and Policy, 3rd ed. (Markham, Ont.: Butterworths, 2007) at 188.  See also 
Cuthbertson v. Rasouli, [2013] 3 SCR 341, 2013 SCC 53 at paras 22-23, 52-53 (commenting on the 
relationship between Ontario’s HCCA and the common law on consent to treatment). 
20 BC Mental Health Act, RSBC 1996, c 288, s.31. 
21 Ontario HCCA, supra note x; Ontario Mental Health Act, RSO 1990, c M.7 [Ontario MHA]. 
22 See, e.g., Alberta’s Mental Health Act, RSA 2000, c M-13, [Alberta MHA] s.29. For further examples 
and discussion, see Chapter X [Sophie Nunnelly’s chapter]. 
23	Saskatchewan Mental Health Services Act SS 1986-85-86, c M-13.1 [Sask MHSA], s.24(2);  Nova 
Scotia Involuntary Psychiatric Treatment Act, SNS 2005 [NS IPTA], c 42, ss.17&18; Newfoundland 
Mental Health Care and Treatment Act, SNL 2006, c M-9.1 [NL MHCTA], s.17.	
24 Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46. One might also consider forcible confinement (s.279(2)), or the use 
of force not “required or authorized by law” (s.25(1)).  I thank my colleague Archie Kaiser for assistance 
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discretion, it may give rise to damages for a breach of the s.7 Charter right to liberty and 
security of the person.25  
 
The plaintiff in a battery action in tort need only establish a non-trivial touching or 
interference with her person;26 proof of (further) injury is unnecessary.27  The most 
straightforward cases are those where there was not even an attempt to obtain consent to 
the intervention or treatment in issue.  However, a battery may also occur where consent 
is putatively given but vitiated by fraud, duress, undue influence, or incapacity.28 The last 
of these legal concepts is dealt with further on in the chapter.   
 
Fraud may vitiate consent, for example, where one medication is represented as another, 
or medication is delivered in a covert fashion (e.g., surreptitiously mixed into orange 
juice).29 A further example would be the administration of medication that was “not 
capable of constituting a therapeutic response to the patient’s condition,” yet was 
presented to the individual “as necessary.”30 For example, consider the case of an 
antipsychotic medication administered for the purpose of control or administrative 
convenience, but presented (falsely) as “necessary” to assist with sleep or agitation.31 In 
such a case, it is arguable that this is a battery, as “the defendant’s purpose is outside the 
plaintiff’s permission”.32  	
 
Consent may also be vitiated by duress, which describes the use or threat of force.33 
Consider a situation in which a person is confronted by staff at the ready to restrain, and 
in that condition, is asked for “consent” to injectable treatment.  This would seem an 
obvious case for arguing the vitiation of consent.  That said, determining what constitutes 
	
with identification of these Criminal Code offences.  See also Archie Kaiser, “Mental Disability Law” 
Chapter 8 in Canadian Health Law and Policy, 2nd ed (Markham: Butterworths, 2002) 251 at 297.   
25 See Vancouver (City) v. Ward, 2010 SCC 27, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 28. And see also Hneihen v. Centre for 
Addiction and Mental Health 2014 ONSC 55 (CanLII) at paras 98-114.	
26 Non-Marine Underwriters, Lloyd’s of London v. Scalera, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 551 at paras 8 &16. 
27 Reibl v. Hughes, 1980 CanLii 23 (SCC), [1980] 2 SCR 880 at p 890. 
28 See Allen Linden & Bruce Feldthusen, Canadian Tort Law, 9th ed. (Markham, ON:  LexisNexis, 2011) 
[Linden & Feldthusen] at 80-82.  
29 See Anten v. Bhalerao 2013 ONCA 499 (CanLII) at para 9: “The respondent’s evidence about the 
medication regime and the effect of that medication on the appellant was confusing. It appeared that the 
first medication, including the anti-psychotic Risperidone, was at some point given to the appellant in her 
orange juice, “to improve her compliance.” It was unclear when this medication regime began, when the 
hospital began to give it to her in her orange juice and whether the appellant knew it was in her orange 
juice. Then, on December 21, the appellant was given Risperidone in an injectable form. However, the 
appellant objected because of side effects.” (italics added) 
30 See Dean v. Phung [2012] NSWCA and White v Johnston [2015] NSWCA 18 at paras 62-74, esp paras 
69 & 73. 
31 See David Bruser et al,  “Use of Antipsychotics Soaring at Ontario Nursing Homes” (Apr 15, 2014) The 
Star 
(http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2014/04/15/use_of_antipsychotics_soaring_at_ontario_nursing_hom
es.html)   
32 White v Johnston, supra note x at para 69. 
33 Linden & Feldthusen, supra note x at 81. The authors add: “nor is consent extracted from someone who 
is under the influence of drugs,” citing Beausoleil v. La Communaute de Soeurs de la Charite (1964), 53 
DLR (2d) 65 (Que QB).  I put aside the question of whether drug-related impairment short of legal 
incapacity (eg, even mild sedation) might vitiate consent for the purposes of battery in health care contexts.  
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a vitiating threat of force may be tricky in psychiatric treatment settings, where, even for 
voluntary patients, consent may be said to occur in the shadow of lawful coercion.  For 
instance, some mental health laws provide that a voluntary patient may be forcibly 
detained for psychiatric assessment if he or she attempts to leave (and other diagnosis and 
risk-based conditions are met).34   
 
In other contexts, the courts have not been receptive to the idea that consent may be 
vitiated by the strategic application of incentives and threats in institutional settings 
where there is lawful authority for the deprivation (or anticipated deprivation) of 
liberty.35 For example, in R. v Deacon,36 the Federal Court of Appeal held that it was 
within the jurisdiction of the National Parole Board37 and not a breach of s.7 of the 
Charter, to make compliance with medication (in this case, anti-anxiety medication and 
medication to reduce sex drive) a condition of parole for a long-term offender convicted 
of sexual assault.38 
 
As with duress, undue influence invalidates consent in a manner that is grounded in the 
concept of coercion.  In Norberg v Wynrib, La Forest J. defined undue influence as “an 
illegitimate use of power or unlawful pressure which vitiates a person's freedom of choice."39 
Again it is important to take note of the qualifier “illegitimate,” i.e. without lawful 
authority or justification.  While La Forest J. indicated that this doctrine will have to be 
developed and applied in a manner that takes account of “the factual context of each 
case,”40 in Norberg he stated two qualifying criteria: 1) “an overwhelming power 
imbalance” (i.e., “a marked inequality in the respective powers of the parties”) and 2) 
“exploitation” (i.e., manipulation of the vulnerable party for self-interested ends).  While 
these statements were made in connection with sexual battery, one might reflect on 
whether or how the doctrine might have purchase in psychiatric treatment contexts, for 
instance in response to the conscription of patients for research where there is little or no 
benefit to the patient and considerable benefit to the physician. 
 
	
34NS IPTA, s.7; P.E.I. Mental Health Act, RSPEI 1988, c M-6.1 [PEI MHA], s.5(5).   
35	See (apart from the Deacon case, infra) Stewart v. Postnikoff, 2014 BCSC 707 (CanLII).  Mark Lunney 
and Ken Oliphant discuss a similar line of analysis in the UK jurisprudence, noting that the judgment in 
Freeman v Home Office (no 2) [1984] QB 524 “upheld a prisoner’s apparent consent to medical treatment, 
ruling that the institutional pressures acting on the prisoner’s mind did not affect the genuineness of that 
consent.” (Tort Law: Texts and Materials, 5th ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) at 84.	
36 Deacon v. Canada (Attorney General), [2007] 2 FCR 607, 2006 FCA 265 (CanLII). See also R. v. Payne, 
2001 CanLII 28422 (ON SC) at paras 138-139. 
37 Under its statutory mandate, the Board is to impose conditions of parole that are “reasonable and 
necessary in order to protect society and to facilitate the successful reintegration into society of the 
offender.” (Corrections and Conditional Release Act, SC 1992, C 20, s.134.1(2)).   
38 Under the long-term offender designation (different from the status of “dangerous offender” which 
designates an indeterminate period of incarceration), prisoners are eligible for community release after 
serving their full sentence, but they must adhere to conditions imposed by the parole board for up to 10 
years. See Criminal Code, s.753.1; HMTQ v. Gibbon, 2005 BCSC 935 (CanLII) at para 114.  
39 Norberg v. Wynrib, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 226 per La Forest J at 246, citing George B Klippert, Unjust 
Enrichment (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983) at 156. 
40 Noberg v. Wynrib, ibid at 246. 
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A further twist on the doctrine of undue influence has involved arguing systemic vitiation 
of consent in an institutional environment marked by an extraordinary imbalance of 
power.  Such a claim was advanced in Joanisse v. Barker.41  This was an application for 
certification of a class action based in subjection to forensic psychiatric hospital 
programming alleged to have featured experiments involving “solitary confinement, 
sensory deprivation, humiliation, force, restraints (cuffs), the use of hallucinogens and 
delirium-producing drugs and other forms of physical and mental abuse, under the guise 
of [the supervising psychiatrists’] "science".” Drawing on Norberg, the plaintiffs sought 
to advance as a common issue the question of whether genuine, voluntary consent was 
precluded by the coercive conditions in the facility.  Although the judge rejected the 
certification bid on the ground that the genuineness of consent must be determined on an 
individualized basis, he observed that there was a sufficient evidentiary foundation on 
which to argue that the coercive institutional conditions had systematically undermined 
valid consent.42 
 
All of the above notwithstanding, there are two exceptions at common law to the 
requirement of consent to medical treatment: emergency and public necessity. 
 
At common law, medical treatment provided without consent does not constitute a 
battery where it “is necessary to save the life or preserve the health of a person who, by 
reason of unconsciousness or extreme illness, is incapable of either giving or withholding 
consent.”43  Kaiser has argued that the emergency exception, which arose in connection 
with cases involving persons in unconscious or barely conscious states (and in clear need 
of therapeutic intervention in order to preserve life or prevent “serious and permanent 
physical impairment”), is wholly inapplicable to the mental disability setting.44 However, 
certain statutes allow for emergency treatment in response to mental health crisis where 
incapacity and a severe risk to health are in place.45 That said, the determination of 
	
41 2003 Canlii 25791 (court file no 00-CV-199551CP). 
42 Ibid at para 30. “There seems no doubt that at a trial of the common issues, the plaintiffs would be able to 
adduce expert evidence of the coercive effects of the environment in which the programs were conducted. 
In affidavits and reports filed on the motion,  qualified psychiatrists provided opinions that support the 
position that a voluntary consent to participate in the programs was impossible.” 
43 Malette v. Shulman, supra at para 20, citing Marshall v. Curry, [1933] 3 D.L.R. 260, 60 C.C.C. 136 
(N.S.S.C.); Parmley v. Parmley, [1945] 4 D.L.R. 81, [1945] S.C.R. 635; Mulloy v. Hop Sang, [1935] 1 
W.W.R. 714 (Alta. C.A.).  More robust criteria are relayed in a passage from Prosser & Keeton on Torts 
that is cited by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Malette v Shulman -- for instance, there, the exception is 
limited to situations where intervention is necessary to prevent “serious bodily injury or death” (at para 20). 
44 Archie Kaiser, “Mental Disability Law” Chapter 8 in Canadian Health Law and Policy, 2nd ed (Markham: 
Butterworths, 2002) 251 at 295. 
45 See, e.g., Ontario’s Health Care Consent Act, which provides for “emergency treatment” where an 
individual who is incapable of a decision about a prospective treatment is “apparently experiencing severe 
suffering or is at risk, if the treatment is not administered promptly, of sustaining serious bodily harm”: 
HCCA, s.25(1) & (2).  More explicitly inclusive of mental health-based “emergency” is the Northwest 
Territories Mental Health Act, which authorizes “emergency medical or psychiatric treatment” (contingent 
on incapacity and lack of timely access to a substitute), where the treatment is “necessary to preserve the 
life or mental or physical health” of the person, and where a delay in treatment “would create a reasonably 
foreseeable risk of injury to that person or any other person.” Mental Health Act, RSNWT 1988, c M-10, 
[NWT MHA], s.20(1)(c).  Distinct provisions authorizing use of restraints / means of control are cited in 
note y, infra. 
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incapacity required both at common law and under such statutory provisions is arguably 
likely to be impossible or near impossible to make in the context of a crisis.46  Moreover, 
it is highly questionable whether the conventional institutional responses to mental health 
crisis (use of physical or chemical restraints or seclusion) could be characterized as 
“therapeutic”.47  
 
The common law defence more likely to be raised in efforts to justify forcible 
confinement or restraint is that of “public necessity.” 48  This defence is expressly aimed 
at permitting the use of force to protect third parties – or potentially (here the law is 
murkier, and more starkly at odds with the right to medical self-determination) the person 
him or herself.  
 
The legality of protective measures aimed at control was addressed by the Supreme Court 
of Canada in Wellesley Hospital v. Lawson.49 In that case, a non-psychiatric patient sued 
a hospital after he was injured by a psychiatric patient.  The majority stated that the 
hospital owed “an independent duty to supervise and keep under reasonable control 
patients who the hospital knows or ought to have known have propensities to violent 
behaviour.”50 
 
This reasoning was relied upon, and apparently extended, in Conway v. Fleming.51  
There, Conway’s claim for battery and breach of s.7 Charter rights arising out of 
subjection to seclusion and chemical restraints was rejected on the basis that the common 
law supported 
 
 a right and a duty to restrain Conway when necessary to protect him, other 
 patients, or others lawfully on the premises (staff or other patients) from harm and 
 to prevent endangerment to the safe environment of the hospital or facility.52 
 
The extension of the doctrine of public necessity to permit the use of chemical restraints 
or seclusion to protect an individual against him or herself stands in marked tension with 
the circumscribed terms of the emergency exception. It moreover stands in tension with 
the insistence in the wider jurisprudence on respect for capable (even foolish or highly 
risky) choices.  However, statutory mechanisms in some mental health laws contemplate 
	
46 On the challenges to health professionals’ judgments in relation to “emergency modalities” including 
modalities of control (i.e physical and chemical restraints and seclusion), see Elyn R. Saks, Refusing Care: 
Forced Treatment and the Rights of the Mentally Ill (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002) at 164-
172.  
47 See Kaiser, “Mental Disability Law” supra note x at 296.	
48 See Linden & Feldthusen, supra note x at 99: “Public necessity involves the interference with private 
rights in order to preserve the interests of the community at large”.  The defence of protecting third parties 
may apply where the rationale for intervention is “to save others from danger” (ibid at 97). 
49 1977 CanLii 29 (SCC), [1978] 1 SCR 893. 
50 Ibid at 899. 
51	[1996] OJ No 1242 (Div Ct) (QL) aff’d (1999) 1999 CanLii 19907 (On SC), 43 OR (3d) 92, 173 DLR 
(4th) 372 (On CA).  	
52 Ibid at para 278. 
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just such a contingency.53  These mechanisms vary, with some requiring a threat of 
bodily harm54 to the individual or another, and others only a risk of “harm”;55 most 
articulate a standard of “least restrictive means” and some require formal documentation 
of the use of restraints.56  
 
The case law does not set clear or precise limits on the common law authority to 
restrain.57 However, an essential part of the defence of public necessity (and the related 
defence of protection of third parties) is that the one acting to protect must act 
reasonably,58 weigh the proportionality of the response against the risk,59 and otherwise 
contain the threatening behaviour in the least restrictive manner possible.60  Given 
evidence amassed in recent years about the significant risks associated with use of 
restraints (physical, chemical and environmental),61 these justificatory requirements pose 
	
53	See Mental Health Act, RSPEI 1988, c M-6.1, s.24(12) (“psychiatric treatment” for the purpose of 
“keep[ing] the patient under control”); Alberta Mental Health Act, s.30; Manitoba Mental Health Act, s.1 & 
29(4); Nunavut / Northwest Territories Mental Health Act, s.36.1; Yukon Mental Health Act, s.18; Ontario 
Mental Health Act, s.1(1) (“restrain”) and s.53.	
54	Ontario’s Mental Health Act authorizes actions to place a patient “under control when necessary to 
prevent serious bodily harm to the patient or to another person by the minimal use of such force, 
mechanical means or chemicals as is reasonable having regard to the physical and mental condition of the 
patient” (s.1(1)).  Section 14 of Ontario’s MHA further states that nothing in it “authorizes a psychiatric 
facility to detain or to restrain an informal or voluntary patient”. See M (Re), 2009 CanLII 45568 (ON 
CCB).	
55	Section 1(1) of Manitoba’s MHA defines “restrain” as to “place under control when necessary to prevent 
harm to the patient or to another person” (and see s.29(4)).  Section 24(12) of PEI’s MHA permits the use 
of psychiatric medication or restraints “in order to keep the patient under control and to prevent harm to the 
patient or to another person.”	
56	See,	e.g.,	Ontario MHA, s. 1(1) & s. 53; Nunavut / Northwest Territories MHA, s.36.1(2); Manitoba 
MHA, s.1 (“restrain”) & s.29(4).	
57 There are a few statements of note in this connection in Hneihen v. Centre for Addiction and Mental 
Health 2014 ONSC 55 (CanLII), 301 C.R.R. (2d) 124, e.g., at para 78: “The defense of public necessity is 
available for certain narrowly defined situations of “imminent peril”  (citing John Murphy, Christian 
Witting & James Goudkam Street on Torts, 13th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), para. 24 at p. 
340; Linden & Feldthusen, supra note x at 99.	
58 See Linden & Feldthusen, supra note x at 97.  
59 Simon Verdun-Jones & Michelle Lawrence, supra note x at 520, propose that the standard for 
intervention should be “imminent danger to the safety” of the patient or third parties, and that it is 
necessarily implicit that “the forcible administration of medication also must be delivered with reasonable 
skill and care and represent the least intrusive option available.”  Finally, they note that the defence should 
justify continuing the involuntary intervention only “so long as there is a genuine threat of violence or 
aggression.” (520-21). 
60 Kaiser, “Mental Disability Law” supra note x at 297. Kaiser adds that “non-statist alternatives” [i.e, 
“[p]rofessional standards and practices, hospital accreditation policies, coroner (and related) reports, the 
media and advocacy organizations”] “can assist in reducing or eliminating the practice of restraint and 
seclusion”.  See also H.A. Kaiser, “Restraint and Seclusion in Canadian Mental Health Facilities: Assessing 
the Prospects for Improved Access to Justice” (2001) 19 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 391.  And 
see Registered Nurses’ Association of Ontario, Promoting Safety: Alternative Approaches to the Use of 
Restraints (Toronto: Registered Nurses’ Association of Ontario, 2012).   
61 Wanda K Mohr et al, “Adverse Effects Associated with Physical Restraint” Canadian Journal of 
Psychiatry (June 2003) https://ww1.cpa-apc.org/Publications/Archives/CJP/2003/june/mohr.asp; US 
General Accounting Office. Mental health: improper restraint or seclusion use places people at risk. (GAO 
publication HEH-99-176). Washington (DC): USGAO; 1999; B.C. Dickson & M.S. Pollanen, “Case 
Report: Fatal thromboembolic disease: A risk in physically restrained psychiatric patients” (2009) 16(5) 
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The second of the three core elements of valid health care consent is that the decision be 
informed.63 Failure to adequately inform one who is facing the prospect of a medical 
intervention may give rise to liability in negligence.64  There are two primary steps to a 
negligence action of this type. First, the plaintiff must establish inadequate disclosure, 
i.e., breach of the standard of care.  Second, the plaintiff must prove that the failure to 
disclose caused compensable injury.65  It is at the causation stage that persons seeking 
damages for breach of the duty of disclosure most commonly fail.66   
 
While the duty of disclosure is rooted in law and in the value of autonomy, it has also 
been argued to produce therapeutic benefits.  That is, enabling individuals to learn about, 
reflect upon and form opinions about their therapeutic options increases the likelihood 
that the approaches adopted will be responsive to their needs and experienced as 




The duty of disclosure requires that health professionals   
 
	
Journal of Forensic and Legal Medicine 284; R. Gallop et al, “The experience of hospitalization and 
restraint of women who have a history of childhood sexual abuse,” (1999) 20 Health Care for Women 
International 401; Secure Rooms and Seclusion Standards and Guidelines: a Literature and Evidence 
Review (BC Ministry of Health, September 2012) at 9; D.K. Knox & G.H. Holloman, “Statement of the 
American Association for Emergency Psychiatry Project BETA Seclusion and Restraint Workshop” (2012) 
13(1) West J Emerg Med. 35–40. 
62 See Verdun-Jones & Lawrence, supra note x at 520; Kaiser, “Restraint and Seclusion in Canadian Mental 
Health Facilities: Assessing the Prospects for Improved Access to Justice” supra note x. The 2013 Report 
of the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture observes that, given the absence of therapeutic justification, the 
use of restraints or “prolonged seclusion . . . cannot be legitimate under the medical necessity doctrine,” 
and may “constitute torture and ill-treatment” under the UN Convention.   The Report calls for “an absolute 
ban on all coercive and non-consensual measures, including restraint and solitary confinement of people 
with psychological or intellectual disabilities,” in “all places of deprivation of liberty, including in 
psychiatric and social care institutions” (Human Rights Council, UN Doc A/22/53, (Feb 1, 2013)). See also 
Torture in Healthcare Settings: Reflections on the Special Rapporteur on Torture’s 2013 Thematic Report 
(American University Washington College of Law Centre for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, 2014) 
(http://antitorture.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/PDF_Torture_in_Healthcare_Publication.pdf).	
63 This common law right is also reflected in legislation.  See, e.g., BC’s HCCFAA, supra note x, s.6(e)&(f) 
and Ontario’s HCCA, supra note x, s.11(1)-(3).  
64 Reibl v. Hughes [1980] 2 S.C.R. 880.  
65 This is more properly conceived as two distinct elements: proof of compensable damage and proof of 
causation.  However, I have opted for simplicity in this brief discussion.   
66 See Gerald Robertson, “Informed Consent 20 Years Later” (2003) Health Law Journal 153.  
67 See e.g. Bruce J Winick, The Right to Refuse Mental Health Treatment (Washington, DC: American 
Psychological Association, 1997) at 338-42, and Bruce J. Winick, “The MacArthur Treatment Competence 
Study: Legal and Therapeutic Implications” (1996) 2:1 Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 137.     
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 ensure the patient understands the nature of the procedure, its risks and benefits, 
 and the availability of alternative treatments before making a decision about a 
 course of treatment.68  
 
This implies disclosure of all “material risks”69 including high-probability/low magnitude 
and low probability/high magnitude risks.70  The health professional must also answer 
any specific questions from the patient relating to the treatment.71  
 
In presenting alternative treatments, the health professional must include the alternative 
of non-treatment.72 The expectation that alternatives will be disclosed is even greater 
where the alternatives carry fewer risks than the primary intervention under 
consideration.73  Some judges have restricted the requirement to disclose alternatives to 
those falling within the physician’s own clinical expertise. 74 Others have adopted the 
moderately higher standard of disclosure of those “options that in [the physician’s] 
reasonable medical judgment are appropriate for the patient.”75  In a further modification 
of the standard, the Ontario Court of Appeal has recently stated that a physician must 
advise the patient of all alternatives identified through the exercise of reasonable medical 
judgment -- including those the physician regards as likely to be less efficacious in the 
circumstances.76 
 
What constitutes reasonable medical judgment may be a matter of contention.  Yet it is 
arguable, for instance, that adequate disclosure about treatment options for depression or 
anxiety (two of the most prevalent and highly medicated of any health conditions in 
North America) should include discussion of psychotherapy, given strong evidence of the 
	
68 Cuthbertson v. Rasouli, 2013 SCC 53, [2013] 3 SCR 34 at para 18. 
69 Hopp v. Lepp, 1980 CanLII 14 (SCC), [1980] 2 SCR 192 at 210.  The passage states in addition the 
requirement to disclose “any special or unusual risks attendant upon” the proposed intervention.   
70 Hopp v. Lepp, ibid at p.209-210, and see Hollis v. Dow Corning Corp., [1995] 4 SCR 634, 1995 CanLII 
55 (SCC) at para 24.  Also see the decision of McLachlin J in Rawlings v. Lindsay, [1982] BCJ No 209, 20 
CCLT 301 at 306.  
71 Hopp v. Lepp, ibid at 210. 
72   See Zimmer v. Ringrose, 1981 ABCA 60 (CanLII), 124 D.L.R. (3d) 215 at para. 16 (CA); Haughian v. 
Paine, 1987 CanLII 987 (SK CA) at p.26. In the latter case, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal determined 
that a physician had breached the duty of disclosure in failing 
to advise adequately, or at all, of the available options of no treatment, or 
conservative management. While it may have been open to the respondent not to 
recommend these options by way of treatment, the patient was entitled to be 
advised that these alternatives were open to him. (para 38) 
73 Kern v. Forest, 2010 BCSC 938. 
74 See Bafaro v. Dowd, 2008 CanLII 45000 (ON SC), at para 42, citing Sanders v. Sheridan, [2000] S.J. 
No. 403 (Q.B.): (“The Courts have held that where a physician feels a particular procedure is clinically not 
an option for him to perform on the patient, the physician does not have a duty to provide the option”) 
75 Van Dyke v. Grey Bruce Regional Health Centre [2005] OJ No 2219 (On CA) leave to appeal refused 
[2005] SCCA No 335 (SCC) at para 65 citing Bucknam v. Kostiuk (1983), 1983 CanLII 1865 (ON SC), 44 
O.R. (2d) 102 at 114 (HCJ), aff’d (1986), 1986 CanLII 2686 (ON CA), 55 O.R. (2d) 187 (CA). 
76 See Van Dyke v. Grey Bruce Regional Health Centre, ibid at para 66, and Patricia Peppin, "Informed 
Consent" in J. Downie, T. Caulfield & C. Flood, eds., Canadian Health Law and Policy, 3rd ed. (Markham, 
Ont.: Butterworths, 2007) 153 at 165-166. 
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relative efficacy and safety of this alternative.77 In accordance with the above-noted 
statements of the Ontario Court of Appeal, this should hold whether or not the health 
professional is personally equipped to provide this alternative or is convinced of its 
relative efficacy.78  
 
Even where individuals are subject to involuntary treatment, legislation may require 
physicians to inform patients of the nature and risks of treatment and to take the patient’s 
views into consideration.79  However, these statutory obligations are markedly truncated 
in comparison with the common law duty to inform.  
 
Turning to common law exceptions to the duty to inform, there is a possibility that health 
professionals in psychiatric treatment settings may rely (with what they believe to be 
legal justification) on the highly questionable category of exemption from disclosure 
known as therapeutic privilege.  In Reibl v. Hughes, 80 Laskin C.J. briefly adverts to this 
doctrine, which he indicates has been recognized in U.S. law: 
It may be the case that a particular patient may, because of emotional factors, be 
unable to cope with facts relevant to recommended surgery or treatment and the 
doctor may, in such a case, be justified in withholding or generalizing information 
as to which he would otherwise be required to be more specific.81 
This principle was restated the following year in the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision 
in Videto et al v. Kennedy.82 There, it was said that an individual’s “emotional condition” 
	
77 American Psychological Association, “Recognition of Psychotherapy Effectiveness” (approved August 
2012) at http://www.apa.org/about/policy/resolution-psychotherapy.aspx; S. De Maat et al, “Relative 
efficacy of psychotherapy and pharmacotherapy in the treatment of depression: A meta-analysis” (2006) 
16:5 Psychotherapy Research 566; G. Speilmans et al, “Psychotherapy versus second-generation 
antidepressants in the treatment of depression: a meta-analysis” (2011) 199 Journal of Nervous and Mental 
Disease 142. See also John Huntsley et al, “The Effectiveness and Efficiacy of Psychological Treatments 
(Canadian Psychology Association, Sept 2013), and L.A. Pratt, D.J. Brody & Q. Gu, “Antidepressant use in 
persons aged 12 and over: United States, 2005–2008” NCHS data brief no 76 (Hyattsville, MD: National 
Center for Health Statistics, 2011). 
78 In some circumstances there may be a dispute about whether psychotherapy falls within the appropriate 
standard of care.  See the US case Morris v. Ferriss, 669 So.2d 1316, 1996, where the judge found that 
psychotherapy was not an appropriate treatment for the plaintiff’s “organically based” condition, such that 
there was no duty to discuss this alternative.  
79 For example, section 25(3) of the Saskatchewan MSHA, supra note x, provides that even where treating 
an involuntarily detained patient without consent in accordance with the Act, the attending physician  
shall, to the extent that it is feasible given the patient’s medical condition, [. . .] 
consult with the patient, explain or cause to be explained to the patient the purpose, 
nature and effect of proposed diagnosis or treatment and give consideration to the 
views the patient expresses concerning the patient’s choice of therapists, the 
proposed diagnosis or treatment and any alternatives and the manner in which 
diagnoses or treatments may be provided.  
80 [1980] 2 SCR 880, 1980 CanLII 23 (SCC) 
81 Ibid at 895. 
82 (1981), 1981 CanLII 1948 (ON CA), 17 C.C.L.T. 307 
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and/or his or her “apprehension and reluctance to undergo” 83 a prescribed procedure may 
warrant non-disclosure.   
 
At least one judge has observed that the doctrine of therapeutic privilege sits uneasily 
with the respect for autonomy underlying the right to choose and refuse treatment, and 
has refused to recognize the doctrine.84 Commentators, too, have suggested that the 
doctrine is, if a valid common law defence to non-disclosure at all, then one that stands 
“on narrow and shaky grounds.”85 Arguably, the doctrine ought to be rejected in favour of 
a duty to ensure that information is relayed in a manner that is compassionate and as 
supportive as possible of careful, critical deliberation -- no matter what the person’s 
diagnosed health condition or mental state.86  
 
It is notable that the law on disclosure does not compel dialogue about what might be 
termed structural risks -- for example, systemic post-market underreporting of adverse 
drug events, unrepresentativeness of the research subjects in pre-market clinical trials, or 
industry suppression of negative clinical trial results.87  Nor does the law mandate 
discussion of alternative, critical understandings of conditions or diagnoses (whether 
schizophrenia, depression, or feminine sexual dysfunction).88  These matters fall within 
the purview of bioethics and social critique rather than law.  Law, for its part, maintains a 
careful attitude of deference toward medical norms and judgment, even while anchoring 
disclosure obligations in the circumstances of the particular patient.  Is there a role for 
law in constructing conditions more conducive to critical deliberation about one’s values 
and therapeutic options – and so more promoting of medical self-determination?  
 
	
83 Ibid at 315-16: “The emotional condition of the patient and the patient's apprehension and reluctance to 
undergo the operation may in certain cases justify the surgeon in withholding or generalizing information 
as to which he would otherwise be required to be more specific” 
84 See Meyer Estate v. Rogers (Gen. Div.), (1991) 2 OR (3d) 356; [1991] OJ No 139 (QL) 
(ON SC) (Section 4: “Conclusions on Therapeutic Privilege”): “The doctrine has no place in the law on 
consent in Canada; rather, it has the potential to “"swallow" the doctor's obligation of disclosure and thus to 
override the requirement for informed consent”. 
85 Patricia Peppin, “Informed Consent” supra note x at 174; Archie Kaiser, “Mental Disability Law” supra 
note y at 297.  
86 Mitchell Law Corporation et al, 015 MBQB 88 (CanLII), (Docket CI 12-01-77745) (relying on 
McInerney v MacDonald, [1992] 2 SCR 138, 1992 CanLII 57 (SCC), the judge recognizes a continuing 
role for the doctrine of therapeutic privilege in Canadian law, yet limits its application in the case at hand to 
giving support to a duty to disclose the relevant information in a “constructive” manner (at paras 141-142, 
146, 167, 169, 175).  
87 See, e.g., Ben Goldacre, Bad Pharma: How Medicine is Broken, and How We Can Fix It (London: 
Fourth Estate, 2012). 
88 See e.g., Mary Boyle, Schizophrenia: A Scientific Delusion? (London and New York: Routledge, 1990); 
Joanna Moncrieff & Hugh Middleton, “Schizophrenia: A Critical Psychiatry Perspective” (2015) 28(3) 
Curr Opin Psychiatry 264; David Pilgrim & Richard Bentall, “The medicalization of misery: A critical 
realist analysis of the concept of depression” (1999) 8(3) Journal of Mental Health 261; Alyson K. Spurgas, 
“Interest, Arousal, and Shifting Diagnoses of Female Sexual Dysfunction, or: How Women Learn About 
Desire” (2013) 14 Studies in Gender and Sexuality 187; Lisa Cosgrove, “The DSM, Big Pharma, and 
Clinical Practice Guidelines: Protecting Patient Autonomy and Informed Consent” (2011) 4:1 International 
Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics, Special Issue: Feminist Perspectives on Ethics in Psychiatry 




As stated in Arndt v. Smith,89 the test for causation in medical negligence cases involving 
failure to disclose is an objective90 one, which 
requires that the court consider what the reasonable patient in the circumstances 
of the plaintiff would have done if faced with the same situation.  The trier of fact 
must take into consideration any “particular concerns” of the patient and any 
“special considerations affecting the particular patient” in determining whether 
the patient would have refused treatment if given all the information about the 
possible risks.91 
This test has proven a steep challenge for plaintiffs, as judges often conclude that a 
reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position92 would have deferred to the health 
professional’s recommendations to proceed even if the requisite risks or alternatives had 
been disclosed.93 This reasoning may render legally irrelevant individual characteristics 
such as a tendency to adopt a suspicious, rather than trusting, relationship with health 




Decision-making capacity at common law and in mental health / health care consent 
laws 
 
The last of the three essential requisites of valid consent is capacity.   
 
	
89 [1997] 2 SCR 539. 
90 See Vaughan Black and Dennis Klimchuk, “Comment on Arndt v. Smith” (1997) 76 Canadian Bar 
Review 569 for a critique of the concept “modified objective test” used by Cory J in Arndt v Smith, ibid, 
and the argument that Cory J states no compelling justification for rejecting a subjective test for causation.  
Of particular relevance is the authors’ critique of Justice Cory’s repeated depiction of the plaintiff in this 
type of action as irrational and unreliable – and in particular, as harbouring unaccountable concerns about 
risk (e.g., a belief that a temporary red rash on the skin is a “highly significant and dangerous sign of evil 
spirits in the body” (at para 14)).  As Black and Klimchuk point out, similar concerns said to warrant 
rejection of a subjective test of causation do not arise in the  jurisprudence addressing failure to disclose in 
commercial contexts. 
91Arndt v. Smith, supra note x per Cory J at para 6, summarizing the standard for causation specific to 
actions in negligence arising out of failure to disclose in the doctor-patient relationship, from Reibl v. 
Hughes, [1980] 2 SCR 880, 1980 CanLII 23 (SCC). 
92 According to Cory J, the trier of fact must take into account any “particular concerns” of the patient and 
“any special considerations affecting the particular patient,” as such “the patient’s reasonable beliefs, fears, 
desires and expectations” (Arndt v Smith, supra note x at para 9). 
93 See Gerald Robertson, “Informed Consent 20 Years Later” (2003) Health Law Journal (Special Edition) 
153.  Robertson argues, however, that one effect of Reibl v Hughes may have been to shift clinical practice 
toward greater disclosure.  That is, while plaintiffs continue to lose most often at the causation stage, 
Robertson suggests that the case law since Reibl is marked by an increase in the proportion of cases in 
which doctors are determined to have met the duty of disclosure. (at 155)  
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The capacity to make decisions about health care is framed at common law and in 
legislation as decision-specific as well as time-sensitive (such that capacity status may 
fluctuate).94  In	Cuthbertson v. Rasouli, McLachlin CJ for the majority stated: 
The common law doctrine of  informed consent “presupposes the patient’s 
capacity to make a subjective treatment decision based on her understanding of 
the necessary medical facts provided by the doctor [i.e., “the nature, purpose, and 
consequences of the proposed treatment”] and on her assessment of her own 
personal circumstances”.  When such capacity is lacking, the patient is not in a 
position to exercise his autonomy by consenting to or refusing medical 
treatment.95	 
That is to say that the doctrine of informed consent carries the implicit expectation that 
the individual is able to understand the matters disclosed and apply them to his or her 
own case.  Where this ability, or capacity, is lacking, consent is invalid and the 
consequence is that the intervention constitutes a battery (subject to an alternative 
defence).  McLachlin CJ’s description of the common law expectations of decision-
making capacity resembles the prevailing approach adopted in provincial and territorial 
health care consent and mental health legislation, which typically speaks to the ability to 
“understand” and to “appreciate”96 the matters of primary relevance to the decision.  As 
Sophie Nunnelly notes in chapter X, the three provinces that make incapacity to make 
treatment decisions a condition of involuntary hospitalization (and treatment)97 elevate 
the standard beyond that which applies in other health care contexts and require the 
ability to “fully” understand and appreciate the matters in issue.98 
 
All adults are presumed to have legal capacity to make medical decisions at common law 
– and the onus lies on the one challenging capacity to rebut this presumption.99 Health 
	
94 See Michael Bach & Lana Kerzner, A New Paradigm for Protecting Autonomy and the Right to Legal 
Capacity (Law Commission of Ontario, October 2010) at 47-49. 
95 2013 SCC 53, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 341 at paras 19-21, citing Malette v Shulman (1990), 72 OR (2d) 417 
(CA) at pp 423-24. Italics added. 
96 See, e.g., Ontario HCCA, supra note x, s.4(1); Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 30, ss. 6, 45; 
The Adult Guardianship and Co-decision-making Act, SS 2000, c A-5.3, s 2(c); The Vulnerable Persons 
Living with a Mental Disability Act, CCSM c V90, ss 46, 81 [applies only in respect of adults with a mental 
disability manifesting before age 18, and not to persons coming under the jurisdiction of Manitoba’s 
Mental Health Act]; Mental Health Act, CCSM c M110, s 27(2); Adult Guardianship and Trusteeship Act, 
SA 2008, c A-4.2, s.1(d); Mental Health Act, RSA 2000, c M-13, s. 26; Hospitals Act, RSNS 1989, c 208, 
s.52(2A).  
97 These are Saskatchewan, Nova Scotia and Newfoundland (see note x, supra [citing the three Acts on this 
point]). 
98 Nova Scotia’s Act requires the ability to “fully” understand and appreciate the matters relating to 
admission to and treatment in psychiatric hospital (Nova Scotia IPTA, supra note x, s.18).  The province’s 
Hospitals Act, supra note y (which applies to all hospital patients except for involuntary psychiatric 
patients) states the same criteria, but for the requirement that the individual be able to fully understand and 
appreciate the matters of relevance. See also Saskatchewan MHSA, supra note x, s.24(2)(ii), and 
Newfoundland’s MHCTA, supra note x, s.17(1)(b)(ii)(B). 
99 See Gligorevic v. McMaster (2012), 109 OR (3d) 321 2012 (CA), ONCA 115 (CanLII) at para 59; Khan 
v. St. Thomas Psychiatric Hospital (1992), 52 OAC 166, 1992 CanLII 7464 (ON CA); Starson v Swayze, 
supra note x at para 77. See also Ontario’s HCCA, supra note x, s.4(2).  The Ontario Court of Appeal has 
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care consent legislation typically places responsibility for evaluating capacity upon 
regulated health professionals.100 At common law, the fact that capacity is an essential 
element of valid consent suggests that all health care practitioners must be mindful of 
capacity when seeking consent within their scope of practice.  
 
Interpreting and applying the law – Starson  
 
The law on capacity to make treatment decisions in psychiatric treatment settings was 
addressed in a 2003 Supreme Court of Canada judgment, Starson v. Swayze.101  
 
Starson had been placed involuntarily in a psychiatric hospital following a verdict of not 
criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder (on charges of uttering threats).  His 
diagnosis was “bipolar disorder with psychotic features.”102  He refused neuroleptic 
medication, mood stabilizers, anti-anxiety medication and anti-parkinsonian medication, 
and was found by his psychiatrist to be incapable of making decisions about these 
treatments.   
 
In the ensuing hearing before the Consent and Capacity Board, Starson argued 1) that 
while he acknowledged that aspects of his thinking and behaviour were consistent with 
the diagnosis of bipolar disorder, he valued these aspects of himself;103 and 2) that there 
was no basis on which to expect that the proposed treatments would benefit him (i.e., no 
prospective benefits that he should be expected to “understand” and “appreciate”).104  
Rather, he argued, past anti-psychotic treatments had negatively affected his well-being 
(in particular, his ability to think and express himself); moreover, the primary intended 
effect of the medication (aimed at “slow[ing] down his thoughts”) would in his view be 
inferior to his untreated state.105  Starson’s enthusiasm for his unusual thought processes 
was based in part in his belief that these were essential to contributions he had made in 
theoretical physics.  His doctors took a dimmer view, with one suggesting that Starson, 
	
stated, in connection with disputes about incapacity under the HCCA an expectation of “strong and 
unequivocal evidence” on the part of the one bearing the onus (Gligorevic v. McMaster ibid at para 60). 
See also Manitoba’s Mental Health Act, CCSM c M110, s.2 (stating a presumption that persons 16 and 
over are capable of making treatment decisions under the Act, while persons under 16 are presumed 
incapable); BC’s HCCFAA, supra note x, s.3(1); Nova Scotia’s Hospitals Act, RSNS 1989, c 208, s.52(1) 
[applies to decisions about health care in hospital, except for involuntary psychiatric patients in respect of 
psychiatric treatment, s.71A]; PEI’s Consent to Treatment and Health Care Directives Act, RSPEI 1988, c 
C-17.2, s.3(1); Alberta’s Personal Directives Act, RSA 2000, c P-6, s.3(2) (presumption applies to those 
who are at least 18 years of age). 
100 Ontario HCCA, supra note x, s.2(1) (“health practitioner”) & s.10(1); BC HCCFAA, supra note x, s.1 
(“health care provider”) & s.7; but see Nova Scotia’s Hospitals Act, s.2(r) (“psychiatrist”) & 52(2).  In 
mental health legislation, this obligation is placed on the attending physician or psychiatrist: Alberta MHA, 
supra note x, s.27(1) (physician); Manitoba MHA, supra note x, s.27(1) (attending physician). 
101 [2003] 1 SCR 722, 2003 SCC 32 (CanLII). 
102 Ibid, per McLachlin CJ at para 20. 
103 Ibid at paras 93-95, 102 (per Major J). 
104 Ibid at paras 92, 98-99, 101-102.  The majority also found that, apart from the “scant evidentiary basis” 
from which to conclude that Starson’s condition was likely to deteriorate without the proposed treatments, 
he “was never asked at the hearing whether he understood the possibility that his condition could worsen 
without treatment.” (at para 105).  
105 Ibid at paras 98-99, 102. 
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who “could have made an enormous contribution to society,” was “lost in a psychotic 
world.”106 That said, there was some ambivalence in the medical testimony as to whether 
Starson’s condition was likely to worsen without treatment.107  
 
The Board upheld the psychiatrist’s declaration of incapacity on the basis that Starson 
“was in ‘almost total’ denial of a mental disorder,” and that, as a result, he “failed to 
appreciate the consequences of his decision.”108  They concluded that because he could 
not “relate information to his own particular disorder,” he could not “understand the 
consequences of a decision to either refuse or consent to medication.”109 
 
The Board’s decision was overturned by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, in a 
decision upheld by the Court of Appeal and a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada.  
There was a marked division between the majority and dissenting reasons of the Supreme 
Court.  Justice Major, writing for the majority, placed the dispute in the wider context of 
deep social prejudice against persons with mental health disabilities:   
The tendency to conflate mental illness with lack of capacity, which occurs to an 
even greater extent when involuntary commitment is involved, has deep historical 
roots, and even though changes have occurred in the law over the past twenty 
years, attitudes and beliefs have been slow to change.  For this reason it is 
particularly important that autonomy and self-determination be given priority 
when assessing individuals in this group.110 
There was a basic level of agreement as between the majority and dissent on the meaning 
of the statutory criteria of “understanding” and “appreciation.”  That is, the first criterion 
“requires the cognitive ability to process, retain and understand the relevant information,” 
and the second “requires the patient to be able to apply the relevant information to his or 
her circumstances, and to be able to weigh the foreseeable risks and benefits of a decision 
or lack thereof.”111  Yet the majority and dissenting opinions diverged in important 
respects on further aspects of the interpretation and application of the test.   
 
Two key principles of precedential value were expressed by the majority of the Supreme 
Court in Starson.  The first is advanced in three linked statements.  First, one is not 
required to describe one’s condition as an illness or to characterize it in negative terms, 
nor is one required to agree with a physician’s opinion regarding its cause, in order to 
avoid a determination of incapacity.112  Second, if one demonstrates an appreciation of 
the information relevant to the decision (including the likely consequences of treatment 
or non-treatment), one will satisfy the criterion of appreciation, regardless of whether one 
	
106 Ibid at para 44 (quoting Dr. Posner). 
107 Ibid at paras 103-104, per Major J.  See also the different reading of the evidence on the part of 
McLachlin CJ, at paras 2 & 4, 28 & 43-45. 
108 Ibid at para 90. 
109 Ibid at para 70. 
110 Ibid at para 77, citing D. N. Weisstub, Enquiry on Mental Competency:  Final Report (Toronto: 
Publications Toronto, 1990) at 116. 
111 Starson, ibid at para 78.  
112 Ibid at para 79. 
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disagrees with a physician’s treatment recommendation.113  However -- and this is the 
third linked statement -- if one is unable (on being given a proper chance to demonstrate 
ability) to recognize that one is affected by one’s condition, one is incapable of applying 
the relevant information about treatment and non-treatment to oneself and so of 
appreciating the consequences of one’s decision.114 
 
The first two statements express an imperative of respect for individuals’ diverse values, 
even where those values diverge from those informing physicians’ treatment 
recommendations.115  The lingering question, however, is how to distinguish dissident yet 
capable weightings of facts and foreseeable consequences from inability to appreciate 
these matters -- particularly where one’s preferences appear to be deeply in conflict with 
one’s interests.  The third statement represents the Starson majority’s effort to distinguish 
dissident but capable opinions about the value to be accorded the matters of relevance to 
treatment choice – including one’s actual and anticipated mental/psychosocial condition, 
with and without treatment – from inability to recognize (and so appreciate) the relevant 
facts.  Foremost among the matters requiring recognition is the fact that one “is affected” 
by the “manifestations” of one’s diagnosed condition.  Inability to do so means one 
cannot appreciate what is at stake in the treatment choice.  In this way, the majority seeks 
to locate something other than competing values or normative judgments - some 
objective, empirically-grounded bedrock - on which to anchor incapacity.  
 
The second (simpler) principle articulated by the Starson majority is that because 
capacity assessment aims at gauging ability, it is impermissible to infer incapacity simply 
from an individual’s failure to demonstrate adequacy to the test.  Rather, one must inquire 
into the reasons for this failure. Circumstances that might interfere with a demonstration 
of capacity include lack of information, sedation,116 transient emotional upset,117 or, one 
might speculate, deep opposition to the circumstances that have brought one to the point 
of capacity assessment.   
 
The majority in Starson ultimately concluded, inter alia, that Starson’s enthusiasm for his 
unusual manner of thinking qualified as a form of appreciation of his condition.  
Moreover, it concluded that Starson’s doctors had not established the likely benefits of 
treatment (i.e., benefits that Starson should be expected to “appreciate”).118 
	
113 Ibid at para 8o. 
114 Ibid at para 79. 
115 See George Crowder, Liberalism and Value Pluralism (London: Continuum Publishers, 2002). The 
majority judgment in Starson is arguably consonant with Crowder’s account (at 197) of the three primary 
expressions of value pluralism within the liberal tradition: 1) “attention to the range and distinctiveness of 
values”; 2) “attention to the particularity of concrete situations”; and 3) “attention to the individual persons 
affected by one’s decision”.  Crowder cites as exemplary of pluralist liberalism Isaiah Berlin’s critique of 
“those versions of positive liberty that make it possible for leaders to ‘ignore the actual wishes of men or 
societies, to bully, oppress, torture them in the name, and on behalf, of their ‘real’ selves.” (Berlin, “Two 
Concepts of Liberty” in Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969) 118 at 133).  
116 Starson supra note x at para 15, citing the Weisstub Report, supra note y at 421-22. 
117 See Crewe (Re), 2007 NSSC 322 (CanLII), 259 NSR (2d) 273. 
118 Starson, supra note x at paras 95, 102, & 105-106.  It is important to note that the majority placed 
particular importance on the fact that Starson had acknowledged a need for some form of treatment (indeed, 
treatment in hospital) – i.e., a need for psychotherapeutic counseling. See paras 93 & 105. 
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Chief Justice McLachlin in dissent endorsed the principles that transient circumstances 
should not prejudice the assessment of capacity,119 and that disagreement about one’s 
diagnosis should not be determinative of incapacity.120  However, she parted ways with 
the majority on whether treatment refusal may be capable where it is based in denial of 
illness.121 Instead, she found that a lack of appreciation may be inferred from failure to 
regard objective symptoms as an illness (relevant to the proposed treatment).122  As Dull 
has argued,123 the dissent thus roots capacity in the concept of “insight” or awareness of 
one’s symptoms as pathological.124  Thus, on the dissent’s approach, evaluation of the 
ability to appreciate the matters of relevance to a treatment decision requires a judgment 
about the appropriateness of the individual’s affective and evaluative responses to his or 
her condition and prospects.125 On this understanding, the primary flaw of the majority 
was its allowing that appreciation of one’s condition may include “enthusiasm for 
objective symptoms.”126  
 
Should it be possible, as the dissent in Starson suggests, to base a conclusion of 
incapacity on an individual’s relative preference for his or her pathologized condition?  
Or is the conferring of such authority on medical personnel fundamentally at odds with 
the interest in medical self-determination?   
 
Dull observes that lower courts have frequently departed from the majority’s reasoning in 
Starson by superficially applying the principles stated by the majority while privileging 
those stated by the dissent, particularly the principle that “appreciation” requires 
acknowledgement that the symptoms associated with one’s illness are problematic, along 
with recognition of one’s need for treatment.127  The cases typically feature little or no 
	
119 Starson, supra note x at paras 14-15 (per McLachlin CJ). 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid at para 27, per McLachlin CJ (citing the reasoning of the Board  with approval). 
122 Starson, supra note x per McLachlin CJ (citing the reasoning of the Board with approval) at para 28 
(italics added): The full statement is: “The Board never suggested that Professor Starson denied all his 
difficulties and symptoms; indeed, it expressly acknowledged this.  The Board did suggest, entirely 
accurately, that Professor Starson did not see his symptoms and difficulties as an illness or a problem 
relevant to the proposals for treatment.” 
123 Monique W. Dull, “Starson v. Swayze, 2003-2008: Appreciating the Judicial Consequences” (2009) 17 
Health Law Journal 51. Dull examines the 13 court judgments during this period that followed or 
distinguished the reasoning in Starson. 
124 Ibid at 60, citing Ruth Macklin, “Some problems in gaining informed consent from psychiatric patients” 
(1982) 31 Emory LJ 345 at 358.  Dull adds the following observation on the effect of delusional ideation on 
capacity: “All commentators agree that delusions only leave capacity intact if the delusions are limited to 
other topics entirely unrelated to the treatment decision.  However, delusional thinking may preclude a 
patient’s appreciation of the information with respect to himself, or may cloud his more basic 
‘understanding’ that the symptoms are impairments, not enhancements.” (at 61-62).  
125 Dull, ibid at 60-62, 68-70. 
126 Ibid at 66. 
127 See, e.g., Sevels v. Fleming, 2007 CanLII 18577 (ON SC); Gajewski v. Wilkie, 2014 ONCA 897 
(CanLii); D'Almeida v. Barron, 2010 ONCA 564 (CanLII) (at para 25: the appellant “believes that he will 
continue to improve without the medication. The respondent's opinion that the appellant's condition will 
deteriorate is firmly anchored in the evidence, including evidence of the experience both before and after 
the appellant began treatment”).  
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deliberation on how far respect for alternative or dissident evaluation of one’s condition 
may reach, or what is required (in the absence of acceptance of treatment) to demonstrate 
appreciation.  However, there have been some limited exceptions, foregrounding the 
principle that the determination of incapacity must not be based on the individual’s 
failure to agree with a given diagnosis or with the need for a (specific) treatment,128 and 
the importance of considering contextual factors that may be impeding the individual’s 




One critique of the legal apparatus constructed around the capacity to make treatment 
choices is that it is of little consequence in practice; that is, given that evaluation of 
treatment capacity is most commonly resorted to in the face of treatment resistance, in 
addition to the discretion built into the legal standard, such evaluations may amount in 
practice to a pro forma exercise in rationalizing involuntary treatment rather than a 
principled dividing line between whose wishes should and should not be respected.130  
 
Apart from this fundamental concern, there are two major streams of critique that run at 
odds with each other.  On the one side are those who argue that the dominant legal 
standards fail to pick up on forms of impaired decision-making that should, but do not, 
register as bases for concluding legal incapacity. For instance, some argue that existing 
standards are inordinately cognitive in orientation, and so neglect pathological 
disturbances of affective or evaluative aspects of decision-making.131   
 
On the other side are those who argue that standards of legal capacity unjustly 
discriminate against persons with mental health and intellectual disabilities.  One version 
of this critique argues that there is never justification for denying legal agency to a person 
on the basis of differences in mental functioning; instead, the will and/or preferences of 
	
128 See Neto v. Klukach, [2004] OJ No 394, [2004] CCS No 8158 (Sup Ct) (although, as Dull points out, 
this was a decision in which the individual originally assessed as incapable accepted the diagnosis of 
bipolar disorder and additionally acknowledged a need for treatment -- she preferred lithium to anti-
psychotic medications); see also Anten v. Bhalerao 2013 ONCA 499 (CanLII).  
129 Crewe (Re), 2007 NSSC 322 (CanLII), 259 NSR (2d) 273. 
130 See, e.g., A. Kaiser,  “Mental Disability Law” supra note x at 300: “[T]he twin elements of the 
malleability of these structuring devices [i.e., statutory criteria for assessment of capacity] and the 
comparative invisibility of most determinations may turn statutory statements into merely symbolic 
gestures.”  
131 For instance, some clinicians and bioethicists have observed that persons diagnosed with anorexia 
nervosa tend to exhibit ambivalence as between an overriding will to thinness and a stated preference to 
avoid death or serious heath consequences.  Moreover, they argue that such ambivalence (which they 
suggest is rooted in affective and volitional rather than strictly cognitive dimensions of decision-making) 
represents a form of impaired decision-making that “may be missed by standard assessment criteria”. (Tony 
Hope et al, “Agency, ambivalence and authenticity: the many ways in which anorexia nervosa can affect 
autonomy” (2013) 9(1) International Journal of Law in Context 20 at 21). See also Louis Charland et al, 
“Anorexia Nervosa as a Passion” (2013) 20(4) Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology 353. See also 
Catriona MacKenzie and Wendy Rogers, “Autonomy, vulnerability and capacity: a philosophical appraisal 
of the Mental Capacity Act” (2013) 9(1) International Journal of Law in Context 37 (assessors should 
“refer to a range of more demanding autonomy conditions relating to authenticity, diachronic coherence 
and consistency, accountability to others, and affective attitudes towards oneself.”) 
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all persons should have normative force, subject to legal limits otherwise regulating 
social interaction.132 To this may be added the critique that the standards for legal 
capacity do not reflect the often intuitive or unreflective, frankly irrational ways that 
people tend to make decisions in everyday life;133 here the argument is that the law 
should not place higher expectations on those targeted for capacity assessment than on 
others who are accorded reflexive respect for their decisions.  Finally, the discrimination 
critique draws on the broad discretion built into standards of incapacity, along with the 
deference typically accorded assessors by oversight bodies, to argue that capacity 
assessment masks the arbitrary or systematic imposition of professional values and 
preferences over those of persons assessed.   
Treatment Decision-Making in the Event of Incapacity  
  
In British Columbia, mental health legislation provides for treatment of involuntary 
psychiatric patients at the discretion of the treating psychiatrist, regardless of treatment 
capacity status; in Saskatchewan and Newfoundland, too, involuntary patients (who are 
in these jurisdictions by definition deemed incapable of treatment decision-making) are 
subject to treatment at the physician’s discretion.134 Otherwise, apart from the possibility 
of an advance directive (in jurisdictions where these have direct effect, absent a 
designated proxy),135 treatment decisions in the event of legal incapacity are made by a 
substitute decision-maker – typically identified by way of a ranked list of familial 
relationships, with the Public Guardian as last resort.136  
 
There are three main ways that statutory regimes structure the decisions of substitute 
decision-makers.  These are: 1) prioritization of prior capable wishes (with reversion to a 
best interests standard where such wishes are unknown or inapplicable to the 
circumstances) 137; 2) a best interests standard, which may or may not include 
consideration of prior capable (and/or contemporaneous) wishes, along with other 
matters, such as risk-benefit and least restrictive means assessment;138 and 3) a hybrid 
	
132 See e.g. Michael Bach & Lana Kerzner, supra note 94 at 103-114 (support for the exercise of legal 
capacity as an expression of the duty to accommodate disability under statutory human rights laws and s.15 
of the Charter); Eilionoir Flynn & Anna Arstein-Kerslake, “The Support Model of Legal Capacity: Fact, 
Fiction or Fantasy?” (2014) 32 Berkeley Journal of International Law 134 esp at 127-130; Tina Minkowitz, 
“The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Right to be Free of 
Nonconsensual Psychiatric Interventions” (2007) 34(2) Syracuse Journal of International Law and 
Commerce 405 at 408-412. See also the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General 
Comment No. 1 (2014): Article 12 (CRPD / G / GC / 1) (discussed below).  
133 On this general claim, see e.g. Dan Ariely, Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces that Shape our 
Decisions (New York: Harpercollins, 2008).  
134 BC MHA, supra note x, ss 8 & 31(1); Sask MHSA, supra note x, ss. 25(2) & 27; Newfoundland 
MHCTA, supra note x, s.35. 
135 For in-depth discussion of differences among Canadian jurisdictions with regard to the legal effect given 
advance directives, see Advocacy Centre for the Elderly and Dykeman Dewhirst O’Brien LLP, Health 
Care Consent and Advance Care Planning in Ontario (Toronto: Law Commission of Ontario, 2014) (Part 
V: “Health Care Consent and Advance Care Planning: A National and International Review”). 
136 See, e.g., NS IPTA, s.38; NS Hospitals Act, s.54; NS Personal Directives Act, s.2(j), s.14. 
137 See Ontario HCCA, s.21; NWT MHA, Nunavut MHA, s. 19.4 (7); BC HCCFAA, s.19 (per s.2, the 
HCCFAA does not apply to treatment of involuntary patients under the BC MHA). 
138 See, e.g., Alta MHA, s.28(4).   
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model requiring compliance with prior capable wishes unless this would endanger the 
physical or mental health of the individual or a third party.139 
 
Ontario’s Health Care Consent Act requires that substitute decision-makers comply with 
the individual’s prior capable wishes (whether or not the person is an involuntary 
patient).140  However, there are some caveats.  First, the requirement is limited to prior 
capable wishes that are “applicable to the circumstances.”141  In Conway v. Jacques,142 the 
Ontario Court of Appeal relied on this requirement to uphold a tribunal decision 
invalidating a decision of Conway’s mother to refuse anti-psychotic medications on his 
behalf.  In particular, the Court confirmed that deterioration of Conway’s condition, 
along with “radical” improvements in anti-psychotic medications, had rendered his prior 
capable wish not to be treated with such medications inapplicable.143  
 
Second, the Health Care Consent Act allows departure from a prior capable wish where it 
is “impossible” for the substitute decision-maker to comply with the wish.144 Finally, the 
substitute decision-maker (or physician “on the substitute’s behalf”) may apply for 
permission to depart from a prior capable wish on the basis that the person, if she were 
capable, would probably give consent because the likely result of the treatment is 
significantly better than would have been anticipated in comparable circumstances at the 
time the wish was expressed.145 
 
IV New Directions in Law and Policy:  Supported decision-making 
Canadian law has crafted a web of protections around medical treatment -- protections 
rooted in the expectation that treatment requires consent, and that consent must be 
voluntary, informed, and capable.  In the case of psychiatric treatment, however, these 
protections are hedged with qualifications.  In the psychiatric hospital context, in 
	
139 NS IPTA, s.39(b). 
140 See HCCA, s.21. This element of Ontario’s law reflects the Ontario Court of Appeal’s ruling in Fleming 
v. Reid (1991), 4 O.R. (3d) 74 (C.A.), wherein the Court determined that Ontario’s Mental Health Act was 
in breach of s.7 of the Charter, in permitting a tribunal to disregard the prior capable wishes of involuntary 
psychiatric patients deemed incapable of treatment decisions.  On the conflicting interpretations of the 
breadth of the court’s holding, (i.e., whether the unconstitutionality consisted in overriding prior capable 
wishes per se, or simply in overriding those wishes without a hearing), see Peter Carver, “Mental Health 
Law in Canada” in Canadian Health Law and Policy, Jocelyn Downie, Timothy Caulfield & Colleen 
Flood, eds (Markham: LexisNexis, 2011) 341 at 358.    
141 HCCA, s.21(1).   
142 (2002), 59 O.R. (3d) 737. 
143 Ibid at paras 37-38.  Given the recent deflation of claims about the radically improved efficacy and side 
effect profiles of the new (“atypical”) generation of antipsychotic medications, the assertions made by the 
Board (and repeated with approval by the court) in Conway v Jacques urge caution where improvements in 
efficacy are advanced as a basis for departing from prior capable wishes. (See, e.g., L. Hartling et al, 
“Antipsychotics in adults with schizophrenia: comparative effectiveness of first-generation versus second-
generation medications: a systematic review and meta-analysis” (2012) 157(7) Ann Intern Med. 498).  At 
one point Sharpe JA for Court of Appeal remarks: “The improvement is so significant that the Board 
analogized the new anti-psychotic medication to the advent of penicillin for the treatment of infections.” (at 
38) 
144 HCCA, s.21(1) 2. 
145 HCCA, s.36. 
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particular, the putatively universal legal requirement of consent may be suspended or 
significantly circumscribed, such that even for voluntary patients, treatment choice may 
be said to take place in the shadow of coercion.   
Fights about psychiatric treatment tend to involve starkly opposed perspectives as 
between medical professionals (perhaps also family members) and those identified for 
treatment, on the facts as well as values of relevance to the decision.  Such fights are not 
likely to yield clear winners.  That is, just as there is no cause for celebration in forced 
treatment (even if one favours a “human needs” approach),146 so there is typically no 
great personal victory in being granted the right to refuse – at least, not if that is all one 
has. 
The title of this chapter points to something beyond the standoff of power and resistance 
described so far.  It contrasts “insight” (a term often used as a proxy for legal capacity, 
describing acceptance of illness and of the need for treatment) with “incite” (meaning “to 
provoke action,” as in: to incite a riot).  The idea is to suggest that the law on consent to 
psychiatric treatment may be undergoing a shift in orientation from a primary 
preoccupation with expert evaluation of the internal capacities of the psychiatric subject 
to a concern that public authorities provide meaningful relational supports for treatment 
choice – as one component of a broader duty to provide the social determinants of mental 
health.  
What is supported decision-making? 
Earlier, I noted the argument that the standards of legal capacity tend to be constructed 
and applied in ways that discriminate against or disproportionately burden persons 
diagnosed with mental health disabilities.  Supported decision-making has been identified 
as a key component of a fundamental equality- and autonomy-based “paradigm shift” 
aimed at displacing paternalism and disregard for the equal legal personhood of persons 
with disabilities, in and beyond psychiatric treatment contexts.147 
Gooding writes: “Supported decision-making refers to a decision made by a person, on 
his or her own behalf, with support from others in order to exercise legal capacity.”148 
This leaves open the question of the precise nature of the state’s role in creating the legal 
	
146 One of Scott Starson’s doctors, in his testimony before the Ontario Consent and Capacity Board in the 
matter that would become Starson v Swayze, indicated that Starson’s uncompromising refusal of treatment 
placed medical staff in a kind of “catch-22”. That is, given Starson’s resistance, treatment had to be 
administered by way of (debilitating) injectable doses of the “dirty” (the doctor’s words) drug Haldol – a 
plan that was certain to reinforce Starson’s resistance to treatment.  See Sheila Wildeman,“Insight 
Revisited: Relationality and Psychiatric Treatment Decision-Making Capacity,” in J. Downie and J. 
Llewellyn, eds., Being Relational: Reflections on Relational Theory and Health Law (Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 2011) 255 at 261 and ftn 39. 
147 See the sources cited at note x, supra. 
148 Piers Gooding, “Navigating the ‘Flashing Amber Lights’ of the Right to Legal Capacity in the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Responding to Major Concerns” (2015) 
15(1) Human Rights Law Review 45 (at p9 SSRN).  See also Piers Gooding, “Supported Decision-Making: 
A Rights-Based Disability Concept and Its Implications for Mental Health Law” (2012) 20 Psychiatry, 
Psychology and Law 431. 
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and social conditions for supported decision-making and more broadly for supporting 
legal capacity.  In fact, there is no consensus on this question, nationally or 
internationally; however, there have in recent years been a number of high profile 
deliberative processes aimed at generating ideas and garnering consensus on the theory 
and practice of supported decision-making.149   
Much of the contemporary interest in supported decision-making may be traced to the 
advocacy work of Disabled Persons Organizations (DPOs) during negotiations of the 
U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities150 (CRPD) (discussed in 
Chapter 3).  DPOs like the World Network of Users and Survivors of Psychiatry 
(WNUSP) and Inclusion International argued for a fundamental change in the 
conceptualization of legal capacity from an internal deficit of the individual to a product 
of social, institutional, and legal arrangements.151 For instance, drawing social and 
economic rights together with traditional norms of informed consent, WNUSP stated (in 
comments informing the draft text presented for negotiation): “[A]utonomy and self-
determination are dependent on having sufficient access to resources so that economic 
and social coercion do not lead to decision-making that does not reflect the person's own 
values and feelings,” and are “also dependent on the existence of meaningful alternatives 
related to the particular decision at issue.”152 
The statement affirms the understanding that all persons require structural supports 
(economic, institutional, emotional) in order to develop and express autonomy.  It is this 
understanding that lays the foundation for the interrelated concepts of legal capacity and 
supported decision-making expressed in the CRPD’s Article 12, which declares that 
	
149 See, e.g., Standing Committee on Social Issues, Substitute Decision-Making for People Lacking 
Capacity (Sydney: Parliament of New South Wales, Legislative Council, 2010); Victorian Law Reform 
Commission [VLRC], Guardianship: Final Report. (Melbourne: VLRC, 2012); Australian Law Reform 
Commission [ALRC], Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws: Final Report (Sydney: 
ALRC, 2014); Law Commission of Ontario [LCO], Legal Capacity, Decision-Making and Guardianship. 
Discussion Paper May 2014 (Toronto: LCO, 2014); Council of Europe, Commissioner for Human Rights 
(2012) Who gets to decide? Right to legal capacity for persons with intellectual and psychosocial 
disabilities; Irish Human Rights Commission IHRC Observations on the Assisted Decision-Making 
(Capacity) Bill 2013, March 2014 (Dublin, 2014); Houses of the Oireachtas Committee on Justice Defence 
and Equality, “Report on hearings in relation to the scheme of the Mental Capacity Bill, May 2012” 
31/JDAE/005. 
150 24 January 2007, A/RES/61/106, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/45f973632.html [accessed 
12 October 2015] 
151 For an account of the advocacy efforts of DPOs at the negotiations in respect to Article 12, see Amita 
Dhanda, “Legal Capacity in the Disability Rights Convention: Stranglehold of the Past or Lodestar for the 
Future?” (2007) 34 Syracuse J. Int’l L. and Com. 429; Rosemary Kayess and Phillip French, “Out of 
Darkness into Light? Introducing the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities” (2008) 8(1) 
Human Rights Law Review 1. 
152 The passage continues: “This is a statement of the interdependence and inter-relatedness of rights, and 
also a reiteration of article 22 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which recognizes that 
economic, social and cultural rights are necessary to the free and full development of the personality”.  UN 
Ad Hoc Committee on an International Convention: Working Group, “Contribution by World Network of 
Users and Survivors of Psychiatry (WNUSP)” at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/wgcontrib-
wnusp.htm.  On the establishment of the Working Group, see 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahcwg.htm   
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persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects 
of life, and that States Parties must take appropriate measures to ensure persons with 
disabilities have access to the support they may require to exercise their legal capacity.153 
 
The question is, what does Article 12 – and, moreover, a legitimate autonomy- and 
equality-respecting legal regime – entail?  As discussed in Chapter 3, Canada has 
registered an interpretive declaration / reservation with regard to Article 12, whereby it 
asserts the legitimacy of regimes of substitute decision-making.154  However, the 
normative force of Article 12 is nonetheless registered in the increasing attention paid to 
supported decision-making in law reform processes in and beyond Canada.155  Moreover, 
in its General Comment on Article 12,156 the CRPD Committee states unequivocally the 
following two interpretive positions that starkly conflict with Canada’s.  First, all persons 
enjoy equal legal capacity, both in the sense of having equal status as persons and in the 
sense of having the power to exercise the rights one holds as a legal person.157 Second, 
states must abolish substitute-decision-making regimes premised on i) vitiation of legal 
capacity by way of status-based, outcome-based, or functional assessments; ii) 
appointment of a substitute decision-maker by “someone other than the person 
concerned,” and against his or her will; and iii) “best interests” decision-making 
permitting non-conformity with the individual’s “own will and preferences.”158  In place 
of such regimes, states must provide persons with “access to support in the exercise of 
their legal capacity” so as to “to enable them to make decisions that have legal effect.”159   
 
The radicality of these statements rests in part on their motivating thesis about what it is 
about the human personality that compels respect for decisions -- not rational-cognitive 
(or cognitive-affective) functioning, but “will and preference.”160  In addition, the 
General Comment reflects the thesis that dominant models of legal capacity are 
irredeemably steeped in relationships of power and subordination.  In response, recent 
debates have been increasingly directed at concerns about whether or how legitimate 
limits may be set to respect for will and preference, if not by reference to a functional 
standard of capacity.  
 
Operationalizing supported decision-making 
 
The roots of the idea of supported decision-making reach back to a period before work on 
the CRPD commenced in earnest, to decades of disability rights advocacy on the part of 
	
153 UN CRPD, supra note x, Article 12(2)&(3).  Subsection 12(4) addresses safeguards relating to the 
exercise of legal capacity, and ss.12(5) addresses financial and property interests. 
154 United Nations, Convention and Optional Protocol Signatures and Ratifications, online: UN Enable 
http://www.un.org and see Nicholas Caivano, “Conceptualizing Capacity: Interpreting Canada’s Qualified 
Ratification of  Article 12 of the of the UN Disability Rights Convention” (2014) 4:1 Western Journal of 
Legal Studies (online). 
155 See note x, supra [Australian, Canadian, Irish, European law commission documents].	
156 CRPD Committee, General Comment No. 1 (2014): Article 12 (CRPD / G / GC / 1). 
157 Ibid at paras 11-12. 
158 Ibid at para 23. 
159 Ibid at para 14. 
160 See Bach & Kerzner, supra note 94 at 59-72. 
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persons with intellectual disabilities and their families.  The anti-institutionalization and 
community living movement – as represented, in particular, by People First Canada and 
the Canadian Association for Community Living – has been at the vanguard of much of 
this historical advocacy work,161 aimed at bringing about a shift from traditional plenary 
guardianship regimes to legal regimes grounding formal opportunities to obtain support 
for the development and expression of independence.   
 
The fruits of this advocacy may be seen, for instance, in BC’s Representation Agreement 
Act,162  which (while explicitly ruling out a representative’s refusal of admission or 
treatment under the Mental Health Act),163 allows appointment of a representative either 
to assist one with decisions, or to make decisions on one’s behalf, or both.  Apart from 
formal legal recognition given those providing decision-making assistance, the Act 
adopts a standard of capacity to appoint a representative that departs from the typical 
cognitive-based test -- instead stating a range of relevant factors, including whether the 
adult has shown a desire to appoint the representative, “whether the adult has a 
relationship with the representative that is characterized by trust,”164 and (gesturing to the 
continued possibility of substitute decision-making under this Act) whether the adult is 
able to understand that by appointing a representative that person may make decisions 
“on behalf of” the adult.165  Another key feature is the standard to which the 
representative must adhere.  That is, even where the representative is to “make’ decisions 
for the adult, he or she is to decide in accordance with the adult’s current wishes, rather 
than applying a best interests standard or prioritizing prior capable wishes166 -- unless the 
latter are conveyed through a formal instrument intended to override future 
preferences.167 In a final gesture toward best interests, however, the Act provides the 
caveat that current wishes are to be complied with only “if it is reasonable to do so.”168 
 
Implications for mental health law and policy 
 
Supported decision-making has not as yet been introduced into any Canadian laws on 
involuntary psychiatric treatment or hospitalization.  Correspondingly, there are deep 
debates about the theoretical premises and practical limits of supported decision-making, 
understood as a radial alternative to legal incapacity and substitute decision-making in the 
	
161 Ibid. at 33-34: “[T]he national self-advocacy association of people with intellectual disabilities in 
Canada, People First of Canada, and the national family-based advocacy association, the Canadian 
Association for Community Living (CACL), have been actively advocating over the past 20 years for 
reform of Canada’s legal capacity and decision-making regimes, demanding laws which are more 
consistent with the manner in which many members of the community make and communicate their 
decisions.  At the founding conference of People First Canada, in 1991, the first resolution adopted by the 
membership was a call to end guardianship because of its violation of the right to make one’s own 
decisions. The CACL launched a Task Force on Alternatives to Guardianship at around the same time to 
propose directions for law reform consistent with the call by People First of Canada.” 
162 Representation Agreement Act, RSBC 1996, c 405. 
163 Ibid, s.11. 
164 Ibid, s.8(2). 
165 Ibid. 
166 Ibid, s.16(2). 
167 Ibid, s.16(2.1) (permitting Ulysses agreements). 
168 Ibid, s.16(2)(b). 
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mental health law context.169  Yet efforts are nonetheless being made to explore the scope 
and limits of government and/or civil society responsibilities for supporting legal 
capacity.170   
 
Critiques raised around the concept of supported decision-making in recent years include 
the observation that there is as yet no solid evidentiary base from which to gauge 
effectiveness in enabling autonomy or resource implications.171  A more pointed critique 
is that supported decision-making laws (at least, where framed as a replacement for 
substitute decision-making) may impede accountability for abuse or exploitation, given 
that the formal source of decisions remains the individual him or herself.172 Perhaps most 
worryingly for advocates, the argument is made that supportive decision-making regimes 
may have a “net-widening” effect, so expanding formal (as well as informal) expectations 
that control or authority over fundamental personal decisions be shared with family 
members or others.173   
 
Still others argue that the practices and concepts of supported decision-making are rooted 
in the personal circumstances and social movement politics of persons with intellectual 
disabilities, and are as such not necessarily transferable to persons with mental health 
disabilities.174 For instance, Del Villar argues that persons with mental health disabilities 
	
169 See, e.g., Piers Gooding (“Navigating the ‘Flashing Amber Lights’”) supra note x; Katrine Del Villar, 
“Should Supported Decision-Making Replace Substituted Decision-Making?  The Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Coercive Treatment under Queensland’s Mental Health Act 2000” 
(2015) 4 Laws 173.  Increasing attention is being paid, as well, to the implications of Article 12 for laws on 
criminal responsibility: see Jill Peay, “Mental incapacity and criminal liability: Redrawing the fault lines?” 
(2015) 40 Int’l J of Law and Psychiatry 25. 
170 For discussion of regimes of supported / assisted and co-decision-making in Canada, beyond BC’s 
Representation Agreement Act, see the Law Commission of Ontario, at 122-141.  
171 See, e.g., Nina A. Kohn, Jeremy A. Blumenthal and Amy T. Campbell, “Supported Decision-Making: A 
Viable Alternative to Guardianship?” (2013) 117(4) Penn State Law Review 1111 at 1128; Terry Carney & 
Fleur Beaupert, “Public and Private Bricolage – Challenges Balancing Law, Services and Civil Society in 
Advancing CRPD Supported Decision-Making” 36(1) University of New South Wales Law Journal 175.  
172 See Kohn et al, ibid at 1123; Piers Gooding, supra note y (“Flashing Amber Lights”) at 15-18. And see 
Law Commission of Ontario, Legal Capacity, Decision-Making and Guardianship: Discussion Paper 
(Toronto: May 2014): “As supporters are intended to have less of a role in the decisions, they are accorded 
less responsibility for the outcomes of decision-making, and the lack of an objective standard makes it 
more challenging to hold them to account where their influence on the supported person has led to an 
inappropriate outcome.” (at 134)  
173 Ontario Law Commission, ibid at 136 (noting a “concern about “slippage” under supported decision-
making systems, whereby persons designated to provide support may in fact act as substitutes”.)  See also 
Terry Carney (“Public and Private Bricolage”) supra note x at 193-196; and Tina Minkowitz, “Legal 
Capacity from a Psychosocial Disability Perspective: A Discussion Paper” (2014) available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2374733 at para 9: “Although we participated in the creation of the support model 
and its distinction from substitute decision-making, many users and survivors of psychiatry and people with 
psychosocial disabilities are uncomfortable with creation of legal mechanisms for support.  We know that 
legal mechanisms can and will be used to take control of a person’s destiny contrary to his/her own will and 
desires.” 
174 Ontario Law Commission, ibid at 135-36: “The concept of supported decision-making has its roots 
mainly in the intellectual disability community, and it is this community which has tended to embrace it. 
Many of those working in the area see supported decision-making as a more challenging fit for persons 
with mental health disabilities or older persons with age-related disabilities such as dementia: certainly, 
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may lack the familial and social support networks assumed by models of supported 
decision-making.175  Related arguments focus on hard cases– for instance, cases wherein 
will and preference may be said to conflict (as some suggest of some persons with 
anorexia, for whom the overriding will to be thin may conflict with the preference to 
live).176 Del Villar makes the overarching point (in terms that recall the difficulty 
Canadian equality rights claimants have had under s.15 of the Charter) that 
“‘discrimination’ does not mean any form of differential treatment, but only ‘unjustified 
differential treatment’”177 Thus we return to the question of whether authorizing 
involuntary or non-voluntary (i.e., incapacity-based) treatment of persons deemed 
mentally disabled is justified, and so proportionate, taking account of  liberty and equality 
rights and any competing public or individual interests.   
 
In light of these critiques, what are the prospects for integrating the principles and norms 
of supported decision-making into mental health law and policy?   
 
Advocacy for a reconstructed approach to legal capacity among users and survivors of 
psychiatry has centred upon advocacy and peer support,178 including formal and informal 
mechanisms aimed at preventing and de-escalating crisis, and assistance in navigating 
and accessing social services.  The contemplated measures of support include 
accommodations at the sites of decision-making as well as broader social and economic 
supports.  Thus relevant institutional reforms may include systemic reforms -- for 
instance, redirecting persons experiencing mental health crisis from emergency wards to 
environments more equipped for crisis de-escalation and one-to-one engagement.179  
Some draw on the Swedish precedent of the PO [Personal Ombuds] Skane,180 which 
involves independent advocates whose role it is to enter into non-coercive, facilitative 
	
where forms of supported decision-making have been implemented in Canada, there appears to have been 
less interest or uptake within these groups.” 
175 Katrine Del Villar, “Should Supported Decision-Making Replace Substituted Decision-Making? The 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Coercive Treatment under Queensland’s Mental 
Health Act 2000” (2015) 4 Laws 173 at 191-192. 
176 See Hope et al, supra note x; Charland, supra note x; Christopher James Ryan & Sascha Callaghan, 
“Treatment Refusal in Anorexia Nervosa: The Hardest of Cases” (2014) 11 Bioethical Inquiry 43.  And see 
Gooding, supra note x (“Flashing Amber Lights”) at [22-25 SSRN], addressing anorexia nervosa (i.e., 
conflicting will and preference) as well as cases involving lack of awareness of foreseeable harmful 
consequences (i.e., back to the domain of failed insight), and raising the question of how law might provide 
a response without resting on disability-based distinctions.  In that vein, see Piers Gooding and Eilionóir 
Flynn, “Querying the Call to Introduce Mental Capacity Testing to Mental Health Law: Does the Doctrine 
of Necessity Provide an Alternative?” (2015) 4 Laws 245.  
177 Del Villar, supra note x at 183. 
178 See, e.g., Tina Minkowitz, “The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
and the Right to be Free of Nonconsensual Psychiatric Interventions” (2007) 34(2) Syracuse Journal of 
International Law and Commerce 405 at 409, and “Legal Capacity from a Psychosocial Disability 
Perspective: A Discussion Paper” (2014) available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2374733; Soumitra 
Pathare & Laura S. Shields, “Supported Decision-Making for Persons with Mental Illness: A Review” 
(2012) 34(2) Public Health Reviews 1.   
179 See Susan Stefan, Emergency Department Treatment of the Psychiatric Patient: Policy Issues and Legal 
Requirements (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
180 See (online) “Swedish user-run service with Personal Ombud (PO) for psychiatric patients” 
(http://www.po-skane.org/ombudsman-for-psychiatric-patients-30.php) [date accessed Oct 12, 2015].  And 
see the discussion of the PO Skane in the LCO Discussion Paper, supra note x at 130-131.  
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relationships with persons with mental health disabilities who otherwise lack social or 
familial supports, to assist in identifying and realizing the individual’s goals.181 Arguably, 
a blend of civil society mechanisms (like the Hearing Voices Network182) and state 
mechanisms are required if the paradigm shift envisioned by advocates is to be 
achievable.183   
 
The debates, in and beyond Canada, about what it would mean to support rather than 
reflexively curtail the autonomy interests of persons with mental health disabilities where 
their or others’ interests appear to be at risk, reflect a deep shift in human rights advocacy 
as relates to psychiatric treatment.  That shift is from an exclusive liberal or libertarian 
emphasis on the right to refuse (although this remains a central pillar of any self-
respecting claim to human rights advocacy in this area) to a new emphasis on state duties 
to provide the conditions for equal participation in the full range of basic social goods 
and opportunities -- not only equal basic liberties (including the right to make treatment 
decisions), but equal access to housing, nutrition, education, work, political life, etc.  That 
is to say that supported decision-making in relation to psychiatric treatment – which 
arguably entails a right to a meaningful range of therapeutic options as well as supports 
for the exercise of choice among those options – is one piece of a broader picture of what 
it means to promote full social inclusion of persons with disabilities.  This marks an 





The concept of supported decision-making animating contemporary debates about mental 
health law and policy brings the traditional understanding of consent to treatment, rooted 
in an informational transaction between health professional and patient, into contact with 
a broader, contextualized model of decision-making, sensitive to how autonomy is 
advanced or impeded in mental health care contexts.  The effect is to call attention to the 
ways that all treatment choices are embedded in power relationships across health and 
related social systems.  Yet this first step of reconceptualizing treatment choice as a 
cultural and interpersonal construct, produced through material supports and mutual 
efforts at interpretation,184 does not in itself provide a clear way forward in terms of 
	
181 Ibid.	
182 The Hearing Voices Network originated in the Netherlands in 1987, and has since taken on members in 
many countries.  It brings together persons who hear voices and their allies with the aim of assisting those 
affected in integrating the experience of voices into their lives. For the UK-based network, Intervoice, see 
http://www.intervoiceonline.org. See also Roc Morin, “Learning to Live with the Voices in Your Head” 
(Nov 4, 2014) The Atlantic http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/11/learning-to-live-with-the-
voices-in-your-head/382096/. 
183 For an evaluation of a range of models of state-based disability supports / funding models, see Andrew 
Power, Janet Lord and Allison deFranco, Active Citizenship and Disability: Implementing the 
Personalisation of Support (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).  
184 For an example of deep reconceptualization of the concept of “insight” which grounds neurobiological 
accounts of psychiatric treatment refusal, see Tranulus, Corin and Kirmayer, “Insight and Psychosis: 
Comparing the Perspectives of Patient, Entourage and Clinician” (2008) 54:3 Int’l J of Law & Psychiatry 
225 (defining insight as “an active, interactional and negotiated process of making meaning of symptoms 
and illness”). 
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mental health law and policy reform. As the debates continue, we are likely to see more 
fine-grained analyses of what constitutes discrimination and justified limits on rights – 
both rights to supports and the right to refuse.  
The political developments leading to the recent interest in supported decision-making in 
(and beyond) mental health law challenge the conventional framing of consent to or 
refusal of psychiatric treatment as a site of unbridgeable difference.  These developments 
speak to the purpose and the potential of law, not as an instrument for delivering health or 
for reinforcing the professional norms of other disciplines, but rather as a forum for 
ongoing deliberation and contestation about the fundamental values and norms by which 
we govern ourselves.  What is necessary for realization of this bridging function of law, 
however, is meaningful access – not only mechanisms for asserting one’s rights at the 
embattled site of psychiatric treatment refusal, but also participatory parity in broader law 
reform processes.  At the same time, meaningful access – and with this, meaningful 
conversation -- requires overcoming the attitudinal and other institutional biases that have 
historically worked to discount the choices and perspectives of those classed as mentally 
ill where psychiatric treatment is concerned. 
